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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
which hold that a prosecution under a void warrant will not support
an action for malicious prosecution in that no offense has been legally
charged. 6 There is a conflict of authority on this point however.8 7 If
the law enforcement officer, or other public officer, escapes an action
for malicious prosecution, he may still be liable for the tort of false
arrest 8 or abuse of process3" in the jurisdictions where he is not given
immunity for malicious acts in the performance of his duties.
There seems to be a growing tendency to extend immunity for ma-
licious prosecution to administrative, executive, and law enforcement
officers, but it is submitted that North Carolina's position is more fair to
the citizen in refusing to extend such immunity beyond judicial officers
acting in a judicial capacity. It is conceded that governmental adminis-
trative, executive, and police officers should not be unduly hampered
in the exercise of their duties, but it is of paramount importance that
the individual citizen be granted some protection and be compensated
for injury to him without right and with malice.
ELTON C. PRMGEN
Torts-Negligence-Availability of Defense of Assumption of Risk
In an action brought by the administrator of a guest passenger in
defendant's automobile to recover damages for the wrongful death of
plaintiff's intestate, the North Carolina Supreme Court recently said,
"Assumption of risk was not available as a defense for there was no
stated does not seem to be in accord with the weight of authority as it obtains
in other jurisdictions .... but it has been too long accepted and acted on here
to be now questioned, and we are of opinion, too, that ours is the safer position."
" Satilla Mfg. Co. v. Cason, 98 Ga. 14, 25 S. E. 909 (1895) ; Moser v. Fulk,
237 N. C. 302, 74 S. E. 2d 729 (1953) ; Wadkins v. Digman, 82 W. Va. 623, 96
S. E. 1016 (1918). Contra: Calhoun v. Bell, 136 La. 149, 66 So. 761 (1914);
Williams v. Vanmeter, 8 Mo. 339 (1844).
134 Am. Ju1-, Malicious Prosecution § 21 (1941).
"' "The second question of law involves the distinction between actions for
false arrest or imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Corpus Juris, Vol. 25,
p. 444, draws the distinction as follows: 'Put briefly, the essential difference
between a wrongful detention for which malicious prosecution will lie, and one
for which false imprisonment will lie, is that in the former the detention is
malicious but under due forms of law, whereas in the latter the detention is
without color of legal authority.' The Court adopted the same view of the law
in Rhodes v. Collins, 198 N. C. 23, 150 S. E. 492. Clarkson, J., said: 'False im-
prisonment is based upon the deprivation of one's liberty without legal process,
while malicious prosecution is for a prosecution founded upon legal process, but
maintained maliciously and without probable cause.'" Young v. Hardwood Co.,
200 N. C. 310, 311, 156 S. E. 501, 502 (1931).
9 "The tort of abuse of process is sometimes confused with malicious prosecu-
tion. In both, an injury is caused by the wrongful employment of legal process,
but the two are definitely distinguishable. In malicious prosecution the gist of
the injury is commencing an action or causing process to issue as an incident
thereto, without justification. Malice, want of probable cause, and a termination
of the proceeding adverse to the party who commenced it must be shown. On
the other hand, an action for abuse of process lies not because the defendant has
set process in motion but because he has misapplied or perverted it for a wrong-
ful end after it has been issued." Note, 16 N. C. L. REv. 277, 278 (1938).
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contractual relation between plaintiff's intestate and the defendants."'
The term "assumption of risk" is often confusing, as it is used by
courts in different senses and in various situations. Assumption of
risk .means that the plaintiff has "consented to relieve the defendant
of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chance of injury
from a known risk."2 The basis of the defense is consent as expressed
by mental willingness and not necessarily through a contractual rela-
tionship between the parties.3  Although there is some authority to be
found for confining the doctrine to cases arising out of the relation of
master and servant,4 or cases involving a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties, 5 the general trend seems to be toward the
availability of the doctrine as a defense in situations where neither
contractual relationship nor the relationship of master and servant
exists,6 under the general principle expressed in the maxim volenti non
1 Goode v. Barton, 238 N. C. 492, 496, 78 S. E. 2d 398, 402 (1953). This
note does not attempt to discuss the adequacy of the defense of assumption of
risk, but is limited in its scope to a brief discussion of the availability of the
doctrine as a defense in certain areas of the law.
2Mountain v. Wheatley, Foss v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031
(1951); Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836 (1943) ; Bull S. S.
Line v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 77 A. 2d 142 (1950) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt.
429, 35 A. 2d 439 (1944); Emerick v. Mayr, 39 Wash. 2d 23, 234 P. 2d 1079
(1951) ; PRossit, ToRTs § 51, p. 377 (1941).
Edwards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875 (1939) ; Bull S. S. Line v.
Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 77 A. 2d 142 (1950) ; Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12
N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ; Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946) ;
Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S. E. 57 (1937); Switzer v.
Weiner, 230 Wis. 599, 284 N. W. 509 (1939) ; 4 BLASrFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AuTo-
MOBILE LAW § 2511 (1946) ; PRoSSER, ToRTs § 51 (1941) ; Note, 26 TEMPLE L. Q.
206 (1952).
'Conrad v. Springfield Consol. R. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N. E. 180 (1909) (but
cf. Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E- 2d 879 [1938]) ;
Modlin v. Consumers Cooperative Ass'n., 172 Kan. 428, 241 P. 2d 692 (1952);
Parker v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 261 Mich. 293, 246 N. W. 125 (1933);
Peyla v. Duluth M. & I. R. R. Co., 218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W. 2d 518 (1944);
Biskup v. Hoffman, 220 Mo. App. 542, 287 S. W. 865 (1926); Papakalos v.
Shaka, 91 N. H. 265, 18 A. 2d 377 (1941); Dowse v. Maine Cent. R. R., 91
N. H. 419, 20 A. 2d 629 (1941); Rutherford v. James, 33 N. M. 440, 270 Pac.
794 (1928); Eddy v. Wells, 59 N. D. 663, 231 N. W. 785 (1930); Eldred v.
United Amusement Co. et al., 137 Ore. 452, 2 P. 2d 1114 (1931); Furbeck v. I.
Gevurtzo & Son et al., 72 Ore. 12, 143 Pac. 654 (1914).
'Edwards v. Southern Ry. Co., 233 Ala. 65, 169 So. 715 (1936); McGeever v.
O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508 (1919) ; Reed v. Zellers, 273 Ill. App. 18 (1933) ;
Walsh v. Moore, 244 11. App. 458 (1927); Pittsburgh C. C. & Sd. Ry. Co. v.
Hoffman. 57 Ind. App. 431, 107 N. E. 315 (1914); Goode v. Barton, 238 N. C.
492, 78 S. E. 2d 398 (1953); Schiller v. Rice, 151 Tex. 116, 246 S. W. 2d 607
(1952).
'Paul v. U. S., 54 F. Supp. 60 (E. D. La. 1943); Mountain v. Wheatley,
Foss v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031 (1951) ; Hedding v. Pearson
et al., 76 Cal. App. 2d 481, 173 P. 2d 382 (1946); Doberrentz v. Gregory, 129
Conn. 57, 26 A. 2d 475 (1942) ; Jackson v. McMillan et al., 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.
2d 773 (1943); Campion v. Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E. 2d 879
(1938); Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N. W. 2d 79 (1952) ; McLeod
Stores v. Vinson, 213 Ky. 667, 281 S. W. 799 (1926): Brown v. Waller, 8 So. 2d
304 (La. Ct. App., 2d Cir., 1942) ; Miher v. Conn. River R. R. Co., 153 Mass.
398, 26 N. E. 994 (1891) ; Landru v. Stensrud et al., 219 Minn. 227, 17 N. W.
19541
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fit injuria-a principle broad enough to cover all cases where an injury
results to plaintiff from a risk knowingly and willingly incurred.
7
The doctrine had its earliest and most frequent application in master
and servant cases.8 The 1939 amendment to the Federal Employer's
Liability Act abolished assumption of risk as a defense in actions brought
under that statute, as did the various state Workmen's Compensation
Acts.9 These statutory bars to its availability as a defense have prob-
ably been responsible for the decline of its use in the courts.
In the last two decades, however, considerable litigation has arisen
from injuries to spectators at athletic contests and other places of
amusement. In jurisdictions allowing the doctrine, in its broader
aspect, to be used as a 'defense, the courts have held that assumption
of risk is available in these actions.' 0 In these cases, proprietors of
2d 322 (1945) (although Minn. court in Peyla v. Duluth, 218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W.
2d 518 [1944], had said that in other than master and servant cases, assumption
of risk is but a phase of contributory negligence, the earlier case was not re-
ferred to in this opinion) ; Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947) ;
Lake v. Enigh, 118 Mont. 325, 167 P. 2d 575 (1946); Landrum v. Roddy, 143
Neb. 934, 12 N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ; Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian Church
et al., 123 N. J. L. 325, 8 A. 2d 567" (1939); McLean v. Studebaker Bros. Co. of
N. Y., 221 N. Y. 475, 117 N. E. 951 (1917); Fay v. Thasher, 77 Ohio App. 179,
66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946); Gargaro v. Kroger Groc. & Baking Co., 22 Tenn. App.
70, 118 S. W. 2d 561 (1938); Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S. W.
2d 828 (1938) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A. 2d 439 (1944) ; Tiller v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 190 Va. 605, 58 S. E. 2d 45 (1950); Emerick v. Mayr,
39 Wash. 2d 23, 234 P. 2d 1079 (1951); Wright v. Valan, 130 W. Va. 466, 43
S. E. 2d 364 (1947); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S. E.
57 (1937) ; Johnsen v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367, 55 N. W. 2d 394 (1952) ; 4 BLASH-
FIELD, CYcLoPEDIA OF AuTomoBIns LAW § 2511 (1946); PROSSER, TORTS § 51
(1941) ; Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REv. 14 (1906) ; 38
Am. JUR., Assumption of Risk § 171 (1941).
7 Hedding v. Pearson et aL., 76 Cal. App. 2d 481, 173 P. 2d 382 (1946); Ed-
wards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875 (1939) ; McLeod Stores v. Vinson,
213 Ky. 667, 281 S. W. 799 (1926); Miner v. Conn. River R. Co. 153 Mass. 398,
26 N. E. 994 (1891) ; Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ;
Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946) ; Gargaro v. Kroger
Groc. & Baking Co., 22 Term, App. 70, 118 S. W. 2d 561 (1938); Bouchard v.
Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A. 2d 439 (1944) ; Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, Inc.,
31 Wash. 2d 396, 197 P. 2d 233 (1948) ; Wright v. Valan, 130 W. Va. 466, 43 S. E.
2d 364 (1947) ; 1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE § 135 (Rev. ed. 1941).
' PROSSE, TORTS § 51 (1941).
9 45 U. S. C. A. § 54 (1943) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-14, 15, 16 (1950).
"0 Uline Ice, Inc. v. Sullivan et al., 187 F. 2d 82 (D. C. Cir. 1950) ; Thurman
et aL, v. Ice Palace et al., 36 Cal. App. 364, 97 P. 2d 999 (1939) (ice hockey) ;
Quinn et al., v. Recreation Park Ass'n et aL, 3 Cal. 2d 725, 46 P. 2d 144 (1935)
(baseball); Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N. E. 2d
879 (1938); Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168,
5 N. E. 2d 1 (1936) (ice hockey) ; Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29
N. W. 2d 453 (1947) (ice hockey); Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Ath. Ass'n.,
122 Minn. 327, 142 N. W. 2d 706 (1913) (baseball) (cf. Peyla v. Duluth, M. & I.
R. R. Co., 218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W. 2d 518 [1944]); Page v. Unterreiner, 106
S. W. 2d 528 (Mo. App. 1937) (golf; this case does not refer to Biskup v. Hoff-
man, 220 Mo. App. 542, 287 S. W. 865 [1926], wherein the court held that the
doctrine of assumption of risk was not applicable in absence of relationship of
master and servant, nor to Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 168
Mo. App. 301, 153 S. W. 1076 [1913] wherein it was held that plaintiff, injured
by foul ball at a baseball game, was precluded from recovery by his own con-
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premises in which athletic events are held are required to use ordinary
and reasonable care for the protection and safety of patrons, and the
doctrine is applied if plaintiff is known to have an appreciation and
knowledge of the hazard.:" In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
"The timorous may stay at home.'
12
Another area in which the doctrine is finding greater application
concerns automobile guest cases. Of course, in jurisdictions where the
rule is applied only in its limited form the defense is not available in
these cases.' 3 But where the doctrine prevails in the more general
and extensive aspect, the defendant may avail himself of the defense
of assumption of risk as a bar to plaintiff's recovery.14 In jurisdictions
allowing the assumption of risk as a defense, and having a guest statute
limiting liability to cases of the driver's gross negligence or wanton
misconduct, the doctrine has been applied with effectiveness.' 5 The
elements of assumption of risk by a guest are (1) a hazard or danger
inconsistent with the safety of the guest, (2) knowledge and apprecia-
tributory negligence "if it cannot be said that he assumed the risk"'); Tite v.
Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N. W. 2d 90 (1943) (ice hockey); Inger-
soll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, 245 App. Div. 137, 281 N. Y. S. 505 (3d Dep't
1935) (ice hockey); Povanda v. Powers, 152 Misc. 75, 272 N. Y. S. 619 (Sup. Ct.
N. Y. Cty. 1934) (golf); Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N. Y.
479, 166 N. E. 173 (1929) (amusement park ride called "The Flopper"); Ben-
jamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 Atl. 10 (1931); Douglas et al. v.
Converse, 248 Pa. 232, 93 AtI. 955 (1915) (polo) ; James v. Rhode Island Audi-
torium, 60 R. I. 405, 199 Atl. 293 (1938) (ice hockey); Keep v. Alamo City
Baseball Co., 150 S. W. 2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (cf. Schiller v. Rice, 151
Tex. 116, 246 S. W. 2d 607 [19521); Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105
Wash. 215, 181 Pac. 679 (1919) (baseball).
11 See cases cited note 10 supra; Note, 26 TEMPLE L. Q. 206 (1952) (pointing
out distinction drawn by some courts between ice hockey games and baseball
games, based on theory that sport of baseball and possibility of being hit by ball
is more commonly known to general public than the game of ice hockey and its
incidents of danger).
"2Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N. Y. 479, 166 N. E. 173, 174
(1929).
1' Goode v. Barton, 238 N. C. 492, 78 S. E. 2d 398 (1953).
1, Mountain v. Wheatley, Fox v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031
(1951) ; Doberrentz v. Gregory et al., 129 Conn. 57, 26 A. 2d 475 (1942) ; Bohn-
sack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N. W. 2d 79 (1952) ; White v. McVicker,
216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385 (1933) ; Brown v. Waller, 8 So. 2d 304 (La. App.,
2d Cir., 1942) ; Landru v. Stensrud et al., 219 Minn. 227, 17 N. W. 2d 322 (1945) ;
Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Landrum v. Roddy, 143
Neb. 934, 12 N. W. 2d 82 (1943) ; Woodman v. Peck, 90 N. H. 292, 7 A. 2d 251
(1939) ; Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236 (1946) ; Gill v. Ar-
thur, 69 Ohio App. 386, 43 N. E. 2d 894 (1941) ; Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App.
356, 123 S. W. 2d 828 (1938) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429, 35 A. 2d 439
(1944) ; Johnsen v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367, 55 N. W. 2d 394 (1952).
"' Mountain v. Wheatley, Foss v. Wheatley, 106 Cal. 2d 333, 234 P. 2d 1031
(1951) ; Doberrentz v. Gregory et al., 129 Conn. 57, 26 A. 2d 475 (1942) ; Pierce
v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836 (1943) (this court distinguishes
between "assumption Of risk" and "incurred risk," limiting "assumption of risk"
to contractual relations and applying doctrine of "incurred risk" where the rela-
tion is non-contractual) ; Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 52 N. W. 2d 79
(1952) ; Bouchard v. Sicard, 113 Vt. 429; 35 A. 2d 439 (1944).
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tion of the hazard by the guest, (3) acquiescence or a willingness to
proceed in the face of danger. 16
The general recognition by the courts of the distinction between
assumption of risk and contributory negligence has come about fairly
recently. The Virginia court, in distinguishing between the two terms,
said: "The essence of contributory negligence is carelessness; of as-
sumption of risk, venturousness."''1 The Ohio court expressed the
distinction: "Assumption of risk embraces a mental state of willingness
whereas contributory negligence is a matter of conduct."' 8 Sometimes
courts do not make the distinction, holding that in cases other than
master and servant and contract, assumption of risk is but a phase
of contributory negligence.29 In actions involving assumption of risk,
it is sometimes said that the terms may be used interchangeably, as
assumption of risk is the practical equivalent of contributory negli-
gence.
20
The North Carolina court has not recognized the distinction, con-
sistently holding that
If two ways are open to a person to use, one safe and the other
dangerous, the choice of the dangerous way, with knowledge of
the danger constitutes contributory negligence . . . and where
a person sui juris knows of a dangerous condition and volun-
tarily goes into a place of danger, he is guilty of contributory
negligence which will bar his recovery.2 1
In Norfleet v. Hall,22 where plaintiff was a guest in defendant's
automobile and was injured in a collision due to defendant's excessive
speed, the Supreme Court referred to and did not allow a defense of
assumption of risk. Mr. Justice Stacy, in his dissent, declared that
"6 Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N. E. 2d 836 (1943); Saxton v.
Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So. 2d 646 (1947); Johnsen v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367,
55 N. W. 2d 394 (1952); 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 2511
(1946) ; 1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLirENcE § 135 (1941) ; Note, 37 MAR-
QuErTF L. REv. 35 (1953).
g7Tiller v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 190 Va. 605, 612, 58 S. E. 2d 45, 48 (1950);
Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 217, 193 S. E. 57, 58 (1937).
"8 Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 66 N. E. 2d 236, 241 (1946).
" Warlich v. Miller et al., 73 F. Supp. 593 (W. D. Pa. 1947) (cf. Rauch v.
Penn. Sports & Enterprises, 237 Pa. 632, 81 A. 2d 548 [1951]); McGeever v.
O'Byrne, 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508 (1919) ; Peyla v. Duluth M. & I. R. R. Co.,
218 Minn. 196, 15 N. W. 2d 518 (1944); Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N. C. 649, 18
S. E. 2d 162 (1941); Singletary v. A. C. L. R. Co., 217 S. C. 212, 60 S. E. 2d
305 (1950).
"'Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N. C. 649, 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1941) ; Wilson v. Moudy,
22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S. W. 2d 828 (1938).
" Dunnevant v. Southern Railway Co., 167 N. C. 232, 233, 234, 83 S. E. 347,
348 (1914) ; Groome v. Statesville, 207 N. C. 538, 540, 177 S. E. 638, 639 (1934) ;
Gordon v. Sprott, 231 N. C. 472, 476, 57 S. E. 2d 785, 788 (1950) ; Bogen v. Bogen,
220 N. C. 649. 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1941).
22204 N. C. 573, 169 S. E. 143 (1953).
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the case "runs counter to the doctrine of volenti non fit infuria," and
Mr. Justice Brogden, also dissenting, made the comment, "It is rather
difficult to be reconciled to the idea that a person can recover damages
for being bitten by his own dog."
In Bogen v. Bogen,23 another guest case, wherein plaintiff testified
that she and her husband started on an auto trip from Columbus, Ohio,
through North Carolina to Washington, D. C., to Philadelphia and back
to Columbus, and that she had theretofore had to remonstrate with her
husband about his careless and reckless driving 365 days in: the-year,
the court said:
The . . . conclusion that she thereby committed a primary act
of negligence conclusively evidencing a want of due care for her
own safety contribuiing to her own injury seems to us to be in-
escapable .... That this is the Aiecessary result of such conduct
is sustained by the authorities in other jurisdictions. Some treat
it under the doctrine of assumption of risk and some as contribu-
tory negligence. By whatever name it may be called, the con-
sensus of opinion expressed in these authorities is to the effect
that one who voluntarily places himself in a position of peril
known to him fails to exercise ordinary care for his own safety
and thereby commits an act of continuing negligence which will
bar any right of recovery for injuries resulting from such peril.
24
In Bruce v. Flying Service,25 an action for wrongful death of plain-
tiff's intestate in a plane crash, the defendant contended in the Supreme
Court that plaintiff's intestate had assumed the risk. The court re-
versed the granting of a nonsuit on the ground that there was some
evidence of negligence which should have been submitted to the jury. In
the course of its opinion, the court said:
Under the evidence the plea of assumption of risk is not tenable.
... The pleas of assumption of risk and contributory negligence
are both affirmative and require a showing on the part of the
defendant to be considered at all; and to prevail as a matter of
law, as to either, it must plainly appear from the evidence that
a reasonable mind could draw no other inference.
2 6
In Erickson v. Baseball Club, Inc.,2 plaintiff sued for damages for
injuries sustained when hit by a foul ball while he was attending a
"3220 N. C. 649, 18 S. E. 2d 162 (1941).
'Id. at 651, 18 S. E. 2d at 164.
.'231 N. C. 181, 56 S. E. 2d 560 (1951).
.Id. at 187, 188, 56 S. E. 2d at 564.
'1233 N. C. 627, 65 S. E. 2d 140 (1951).
1954]
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baseball game. The court held a nonsuit proper, evidently on grounds
of assumption of risk, and said:
Anyone familiar with the game of baseball knows that balls are
frequently fouled into the stands and bleachers. Such are common
incidents of the game which necessarily involve danger to spec-
tators. And where a spectator, with ordinary knowledge of the
game of baseball, on finding all screened seats filled, proceeds
to sit in an unscreened stand, as did the plaintiff under the cir-
cumstances of this case, he thereby accepts the common hazards
incident to the game and assumes the risk of injury, and ordi-
narily there can be no recovery for an injury sustained as a re-
sult of being hit by a batted ball .... Thus, it would seem that
the plaintiff, with full knowledge of all the dangers of the occa-
sion, voluntarily assumed the risk of his situation, or failed to
exercise due care to protect himself from the natural dangers
incident to his situation. And no other reasonable inference
being deducible from the evidence, the motion for nonsuit was
properly allowed.2 8  (Italics added.)
In an earlier case involving a similar set of facts, the court held a
nonsuit proper on the basis that the failure to place a roof over bleacher
seats or to erect a wire in front thereof was not negligence on the part
of those responsible for the operation of the ball park.29
The statement by the court in the principal case is supported by
its earlier decisions. In Morrison v. Cannon Mills Co.,3 0 plaintiff, a
truck driver for a transportation company, was injured while unloading
caustic soda which he had delivered to defendant's plant. Defendant
contended that plaintiff was aware of the dangers involved and that
there was no water available nearby, but that he undertook to make
the disconnecting operation by himself with knowledge, obtained from
past experience, of the manner in which it could be safely done. The
court stated that it should be noted at the outset that there was no
relation of master and servant or of employer-employee existing be-
tween the defendant and the plaintiff and that there was no contractual
relation existing between the plaintiff or his employer and the de-
fendant.
In a still earlier decision,3 ' in a case where plaintiff's intestate was
killed in an explosion at a filling station owned by defendant oil com-
pany and leased to defendant employer of the deceased, the court held
8 d. at 629, 630, 65 S. E. 2d at 141, 142.
Cates v. Exhibition Co. & City of Durham, 215 N. C. 64, 1 S. E. 2d 131
(1938).
( 223 N. C. 387, 26 S. E. 2d 857 (1943).
"Broughton v. Oil Co., 201 N. C. 282, 159 S. E. 321 (1931).
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that as between plaintiff and defendant oil company, assumption of
risk by plaintiff's intestate was not available as a defense because there
was no contractual relation between the parties.
Thus it is seen that the court's statement in the principal case is
in accord with previous North Carolina decisions. But in confining
the doctrine of assumption of risk as a separate defense to contract
cases and master and servant relationships, while in all other areas
considering it as a phase of contributory negligence, North Carolina
does not follow the general trend of American decisions.
. NAOmi E. MoRRs
Workmen's Compensation Act-Accidents Arising Out of and In
the Course of the Employment-Street Risks-Dual Employment
Deceased was employed by the city as cemetery caretaker-salesman.
In addition he was allowed to take private employment as a sexton. In
this dual capacity he regularly visited local funeral homes to solicit
business. On one such trip, while crossing the street, he was struck
by an automobile and killed. In awarding compensation the Commis-
sion concluded that death resulted from an accidental injury which arose
out of and in the course of the employment. The Supreme Court, in
a unanimous decision, affirmed, stating that the Commission was cor-
rect in its determination that while decedent was paid by others
for digging graves, this was related to his general duties as "caretaker,"
and the employee status, as distinguished from that of an independent
contractor, was properly established.'
The heart of North Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act is
expressed in the formula "arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployment."2 In interpreting this section our court holds that (1) "in the
course of employment" relates to the time, place, and circumstances
under which the accidental injury occurs, and (2) "arising out of the
employment" refers to the origin or the cause of the injury.3 This
formula has kept the Act within the limits of its intended scope of
providing compensation benefits for industrial injuries rather than
"branching out into the field of general health insurance." 4 The Act is
to be liberally construed to effectuate the legislative intent and no
strained nor technical construction should be given to defeat this pur-
pose.6 Whether or not an accident arose out of the employment is
'Hinkle v. Lexington, 239 N. C. 105, 79 S. E. 2d 220 (1954).
'N. C. Gml. STAT. § 97-2 (f) (1950).
' Sweatt v. Board of Education, 237 N. C. 653, 75 S. E. 2d 738 (1953);
Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 53 S. E. 2d 668 (1949) ; Walker v. Wilkins,
Inc., 212 N. C. 627, 194 S. E. 89 (1937); Davis v. North State Veneer Corp.,
200 N. C. 263, 156 S. E. 859 (1931).
'Duncan v. Charlotte, 234 N. C. 86, 91, 66 S. E. 2d 22, 25 (1951).
'Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C. 38, 155 S. E. 728 (1930). But as pointed
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